Airliner incident blamed on settings punched into laptop - you mean it's manual? #airlines

Hmmm. Got the weight wrong by 100 tonnes. That's a large error. Trying to save fuel they set thrust at just enough for ambient conditions and runway length... or so they thought. I can understand how this happened.. it's easy enough to do some calculations and punch the worgn, umm, wrong keys in the wrong order... but why don't sophisticated airliners actually weigh themselves? They could (easily, I would have thought, with some sensors in the hydraulics) measure weight and the balance of that weight fore and aft on the undercarriage, before committing to a thrust value. In fact I thought they did do that?

The wrong calculation was made when pre-take-off calculations were made prior to departure, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau reported. It was found that the calculations were based on a take-off weight that was 100 tonnes below the actual take-off weight of the aircraft. The result was a thrust setting and take-off reference speeds that were lower than those required for the aircraft's actual weight.

There have been many, many incidents like this where the results were more drastic, including navigational blunders blamed on similar human error. So why isn't it automated, with a human over-ride?

Picky picky picky - I can't help myself (report on lost baggage) #logical reasoning #airlines

I don't know why I was reading an article on lost baggage, but this extract links to a Forbes report on the decreasing rate of lost items on US carriers, and the disproportionate "success" of low-cost airlines in not losing stuff:

The data seems to reveal some good news for travelers: Airlines are mishandling fewer bags than they used to. In 2007, fliers reported between six and eight bag screw-ups per thousand. In 2008, that number fell to 4.88 per thousand. But it may be that the numbers have come down because fewer people are flying in the economic downturn, and travelers are schlepping fewer bags.

What interested me most was the reasoning. Note that we are talking about a rate of loss per thousand passengers, not absolute values, therefore thinking that "the numbers have come down because fewer people are flying in the economic downturn" doesn't make any sense. That quibble aside (a big one, really) the fact that - for various reasons - people are checking fewer baggage items per trip does make a difference. To be fair to the writer, mention is also made that the low-cost carriers have fewer connection points (ie opportunities to lose stuff) and generally discourage check-in baggage anyway, hence better results. You can't lose what you don't have.

I'd still like to read the full report, if only to help grasp what this statement means:

The December data alone show sharp improvement. Though the number of passengers only fell by 2.5 million from 2007 to 2008 (5.3%) the number of baggage reports plummeted 27%.

So this is "December data alone", which sounds like one month, yet the figures quoted "from 2007 to 2008" are for what seems to be a full year? And suddenly we appear to be reading about a percentage decline in absolute values, rather than the previously quoted "per passenger" values. If we are comparing December 2007 with December 2008, as I suspect, then it could indeed be good news for December travellers. Did they check-in fewer items? Did they choose to fly more direct flights? Did they forget to report what they lost? Did airline staff simply try harder for Christmas? 27% is a big fall - almost unbelievably so, even year-on-year.

Not that I really care, I was just sidetracked. Hmmm, I wonder what the lost-item recovery rate per thousand passengers is?

Stating the obvious (again) - Qantas in trouble #airlines

Having just recovered from the amazing revelation that 'coal mines may close', now I'm reading this gem:

Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation director Peter Harbison said that a currently unprofitable Qantas faces being gutted and reconstructed around a more profitable Jetstar model.

Well the language is tabloid-style, where any restructure is labelled as 'gutted and reconstructed', but the point is made that seeking bigger margins via lower costs will mean a mix of sharper scheduling, more layoffs, increased outsourcing, fleet sales and further creative reorganisation. Of course the Jetstar model is not the only one, just the most likely - given that it's one that appears to work. However Qantas may seek to retain some premium services, at premium prices, with a tightly targeted approach, and it may contract its network of routes. It could also re-engage in merger or 'partnering' talks with other airlines in the hope that size will help.

So where's the surprise in all of this? Hasn't Qantas already telegraphed many of these changes? Given the current global economic situation, drastically falling seat sales and the looming impact of carbon emission schemes, which will surely force fuel costs back up, what else could they reasonably do? Even a return to economic 'good times' will only mean rising fuel prices - and restructuring. So they may as well get it over and done with... and bear the pain.

Airlines - just 2% of the carbon emission problem? #airlines #greenhouse

There's a great article here in the EthicalCorp magazine that touches upon much of what is wrong with the airline industry and how it shapes up to solve some of the issues, especially the carbon-waste problem. However there is much more under the surface that needs to be thought through too. It's a bit like the car industry, in that just one variable - fuel use - gets the focus. So we tend to get bogged down in semantics about fuel efficiency per seat and forget about the bigger picture.

As with road traffic, air traffic demands that a vehicle is built from a diverse set of raw materials; that substantial (often public) infrastructure is laid on for these vehicles and that whole sub-industries are developed in support of designing, researching, testing, maintaining and operating these vehicles. There are specialist mechanics, training institutes, designers and builders. There are airports and terminals, hangars and hardstanding. It's an awful lot of concrete, aluminium and steel, much of it brought to site by carbon fuels and smelted by carbon-emitting energy... so when you add up the consequential emissions they are far, far greater than the simple fuel emission. (Not forgetting also that aircraft disperse much of their fuel-based carbon output at altitude, not just at ground level, and spread it around unlike any other form of transport.)

But as is the case for road transport we choose to look only at the variable - our fuel load. Now this clearly is a better bet for the airlines than it is for the car makers - airlines at least want to maximise operating profit and are under constant pressure to maximise passenger and freight loadings. Unlike a private car user, no airline wants to fly empty airliners around just for fun. And it is important to minimise fuel use, anyway. But we never seem to want to address the remainder - the infrastructure. We turn a blind eye to it because in our hearts and minds we want big, bustling airports, we like to travel, and we like new planes better than the old ones. Overall, we like to get somewhere - anywhere - quicker rather than slower. And planes fit the bill.

Or do they? If carbon emissions truly matter, both as a contribution to climate change and to acidification of our oceans, perhaps we need to question everything - from aviation to fast trains, from private cars to bicycles - and be prepared to make some really big changes. Until we get serious about it we are just playing around the edges.